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federal relations would have been spared the confines of the strained
construction of section 2283 if Congress had evidenced the same confidence
in the federal courts.
MARY BROOKE LAMSON
Prisoners' Rights-Bowring v. Godwin: The Limited Right of
State Prisoners to Psychological and Psychiatric Treatment
According to statistics compiled by the American Correctional Associ-
ation, between fifteen and twenty percent of the prisoner population in the
United States suffers from a diagnosable emotional or mental disturbance,
including neuroses, personality and behavioral disorders, and various pre-
psychotic and psychotic conditions. ' And yet, historically, the vast majority
of these prisoners have remained untreated due to an inadequacy of staff and
facilities, 2 as well as a general apathy towards the mental health of convicted
criminals.' In Bowring v. Godwin,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit expressly held that in certain narrowly defined situations
there is a definite nexus between the constitutional right of a prisoner to be
spared from cruel and unusual punishment5 and his right to receive psycho-
logical and/or psychiatric treatment.6 According to the court, however, not
1. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 441
(3d ed. 1966). See also Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975); Alexander, The Captive Patient: The Treatment of Health Problems in
American Prisons, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 16 (1972) (persons entering the federal prison
system have a 5% chance of severe psychiatric disturbance and 15% chance of serious
emotional disability).
2. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS (1972),
reprinted in ABA COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, MEDICAL AND HEALTH
CARE IN JAILS, PRISONS, AND OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 67 (3d ed. 1974); ArrICA: THE
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972); SOUTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, SUMMARY OF SYSTEM AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERY OF
MEDICAL SERVICES IN SOUTH CAROLINA CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM (1974), reprinted in ABA
COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, supra at 263.
3. See Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 784 (1969);
Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment, II Am. CRIM. L. REV. 7
(1972). Behavior modification has received the most attention in recent years as a form of
treatment. This treatment is intended to conform behavior patterns to a socially acceptable
norm, not to discover and combat the root causes of mental illness. See O'Brien, Tokens and
Tiers in Corrections: An Analysis of Legal Issues in BehaviorModification, 3 NEW ENGLAND J.
PRISON L. 15 (1976).
4. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII in pertinent part provides: "[N]or [shall] cruel and unusual
punishments [be] inflicted."
6. 551 F.2d at 47-48.
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every deprivation of such treatment rises to the level of a constitutional
violation.7 As a result of this qualification, the role of the federal-courts in
alleviating the mental health problems among state prisoners remains some-
what limited.'
Plaintiff Bowring, an inmate in the Virginia State Prison System,
asserted a constitutional right to receive psychological diagnosis and treat-
ment in light of the fact that his application for parole was denied at least
partially because of the results of a psychological evaluation indicating that
"Bowring would not successfully complete a parole period." 9 Bowring
maintained that the state must provide him with appropriate treatment with
the aim that he be cured of the mental aberration that rendered him ineligible
for parole. He based this assertion on a claim that the denial of such
treatment constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the
eighth amendment and "a denial of due process of law" in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 10
The district court construed Bowring's petition for relief as an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,11 but summarily dismissed the action on the
ground that he had failed to allege a denial of any constitutional right. 12 The
court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Bowring's constitutional
right to essential medical care had been violated by the prison officials'
refusal to grant his request for psychological treatment. The court found no
reason for distinguishing "between the right to medical care for physical ills
and its psychological or psychiatric counterpart, 13 and, accordingly, ruled
that the complaint should not have been dismissed without first determining
whether Bowring was, in fact, suffering from a "qualified" mental illness
and therefore entitled to treatment. 14
Specifically, the court held that every prison inmate is entitled to
psychological and/or psychiatric treatment
7. Id. at 48; accord, Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(mistreatment or nontreatment must be characterized as cruel and unusual punishment in order
to raise a constitutional question).
8. See Comment, The Rights of Prisoners to Medical Care and the Implications for Drug-
Dependent Prisoners and Pre-Trial Detainees, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 712-18 (1975).
9. 551 F.2d at 46. The exact nature of Bowring's illness is not evident from the record.
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
12. 551 F.2d at 46.
13. Id. at 47.
14. Id. at 49.
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if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary
skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable
medical certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a seri-
ous disease or injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or
may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm
to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be
substantial. 15
The court went on to hold, however, that the deprivation of appropriate
treatment for such a "qualified" mental illness will not always give rise to a
complaint actionable under section 1983. First, the denial of treatment will
not be actionable unless it is the direct result of deliberate indifference on the
part of prison officials. 16 Second, the denial of treatment may be justified in
certain situations because of the unreasonable costs involved or the dispro-
portionate amount of time that would be required to complete a particular
course of treatment.17 In addition, the court further limited the scope of the
prisoner's right to treatment by expressly disavowing any attempt to "sec-
ond-guess" the propriety or adequacy of the type of treatment the prison
medical officer might choose to prescribe.'
8
The court based this limited right to treatment primarily on the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, recognizing
that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners results
in an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and suffering that is totally
divorced from any legitimate penal interest. 19 The court also noted that its
holding was premised upon the notion that psychological treatment is an
integral part of the rehabilitation process.
20
Though this standard for invoking the right to psychological and/or
psychiatric treatment may seem excessively restrictive, it is for the most part
consistent with the standards that have developed in the general area of
medical care for prisoners. It is now well established that a prisoner's access
to the federal courts for the protection of his constitutional rights is not
foreclosed by the mere fact of his incarceration. 21 Nevertheless, the vestiges
of the old "hands-off" doctrine22 are still evident in the efforts of the courts
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id. at 48.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
20. Id. at 48 n.2 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)). The Court in Pell noted that
rehabilitation is one of the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system, the
others being deterrence, protection of society and the internal security of the corrections
facilities themselves. 417 U.S. at 823.
21. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,821-22 (1977); Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546
(1940); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
22. The "hands off" doctrine refers to the general reluctance of federal courts to inter-
vene in the internal affairs of state prisons. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
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to limit that accessibility by defining narrowly the circumstances under
which a denial of treatment will be considered a constitutional violation.
The Supreme CourtP and all of the circuits24 are in essential agreement that
state prison officials possess broad discretion in determining the nature of
the medical care afforded inmates25 and that intervention by the federal
courts is warranted only when there has been either a deliberate denial of
essential treatment for serious illnesses and injuries 26 or such drastically
insufficient or inappropriate care as to be the equivalent of intentional
mistreatment. 27 Complaints alleging mere negligence28 or the inefficacy of a
particular course of treatment29 do not, by contrast, raise an issue of
constitutional dimension and, therefore, are not cognizable under section
1983. In short, if it appears that the prison officials have made a good faith
effort to deal with the medical problems of the prisoner, the constitutional
requirements have been satisfied.
30
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Estelle v. Gamble3' is
representative of the result that ensues when this medical care standard is
applied. Plaintiff in Estelle filed suit against prison officials after being
denied proper medical treatment for a back injury. He had persisted for three
months in asking for proper diagnosis and treatment, but during that time the
medical personnel refused to prescribe any treatment other than pain pills
and muscle relaxants. 32 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to allege a
violation of his constitutional rights. The Court emphasized that plaintiff
had seen various medical personnel on seventeen occasions during the thiee-
month period and that he had not been denied "treatment" for his ailment.
33
Though acknowledging that plaintiff might have an action in tort for medical
23. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see text accompanying notes 31-34 infra.
24. See United States v. Fitzgerald, 466 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Page v. Sharpe,
487 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1973); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974);
Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 948 (1975); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d
151, 158 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 419 U.S. 813, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974);
Wibron v. Hutto, 509 F.2d 621, 622 (8th Cir. 1975); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th
Cir. 1970); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877, 881-82 (10th Cir. 1974).
25. See, e.g., Ross v. Bounds, 373 F. Supp. 450, 452-53 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
26. See, e.g., Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D. Md. 1975).
27. See, e.g., Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 419
U.S. 813, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970).
28. See, e.g., Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1973); Swain v. Garribrant,
354 F. Supp. 631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
29. E.g., Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1970).
30. See, e.g., Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
32. Id. at 107.
33. See id. The Court did not disagree with plaintiff's conteniion that the seriousness of
his back injury may have warranted further diagnosis and treatment. Rather: the Court main-
tained that this was a question of medical judgment and, therefore, a matter of medical
malpractice and not cruel and unusual punishment.
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malpractice, the Court refused to classify the treatment provided by prison
medical personnel as "deliberate indifference. "
34
The standards that evolved in the area of medical care have been
applied in the past to specific cases involving the alleged denial of psycho-
logical and psychiatric treatment. 35 For instance, in Greear v. Loving,36
plaintiff alleged that he had never been afforded the opportunity to see a
psychiatrist to determine if any treatment was available for his emotional
problems. The district court ordered a psychiatric evaluation in which it was
determined that he was, indeed, suffering from emotional instability, im-
maturity and impulsivity. The examining psychiatrist concluded, however,
that there was no need for any treatment at that time. 37 The court then
dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had already been
afforded sufficient medical care for his essential needs. 38 In Davis v.
Schmidt,39 plaintiff was examined by a psychiatrist on several occasions,
but the only treatment that he received was medication intended to neutralize
temporarily the manifested symptoms of the mental illness.40 Plaintiff's
petition requesting actual psychiatric treatment was denied on the ground
that he had alleged only a disagreement with the psychiatrist over the
propriety of the medically acceptable course of treatment that had been
prescribed for him.
41
Greear and Davis are representative of the results that a prisoner
requesting treatment for mental health problems might expect. Often, it will
be determined that the prisoner's mental or emotional problem is not serious
enough to warrant treatment. 42 In the case of those prisoners whose illnesses
cannot be ignored because of the threat posed to the orderly administration
of the correctional institution, the treatment prescribed may be intended
merely to eliminate the threat by directly combating the symptoms of the
mental illness rather than attacking the cause.
43
The most significant developments in the field of prisoner health care
have occurred in cases in which federal courts have ordered systematic
improvements in the conditions under which prisoners are confined.
44
34. Id. at 106.
35. See, e.g., Flint v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1970); Bishop v. Cox, 320 F.
Supp. 1031 (W.D. Va. 1970).
36. 391 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Va. 1975).
37. Id. at 1271.
38. Id.
39. 57 F.R.D. 37 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
40. Id. at 40. Tranquilizers were the medication prescribed. Plaintiff was also placed on a
waiting list for group therapy.
41. Id. at 41; see text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
42. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
43. All too frequently the treatment imposed on seriously disturbed inmates is directed at
pacification only. For a general overview of the treatment provided for prisoners, see Morris,
supra note 3; Prettyman, supra note 3.
44. STee, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
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Though allowing for the necessity that prison officials retain some discretion
in the administration of medical resources, these courts have held that an
unreasonable deficiency in staff and facilities is tantamount to deliberate
indifference to the predictable health care needs of the prisoners .45 Yet even
these cases have stopped short of setting forth either the degree of care that
would satisfy the minimum constitutional requirements or the applicable
standards to be followed in determining under what circumstances psycho-
logical and/or psychiatric treatment is mandated.46 There has been no
systematic attempt to provide mental health programs for the general inmate
population, even though such programs will assuredly be necessary to deal
effectively with a problem that is so prevalent in the prison systems. 47 In
essence, the right to treatment recognized in these cases does very little to
remove the obstacles that stand in the way of the individual inmate who
desires therapeutic treatment for his mental and emotional problems.
48
In Bowring v. Godwin,4 the court declined to extend the right of
prisoners to receive psychological and/or psychiatric treatment beyond the
generally accepted limits exemplified by Greear, Davis and similar cases. If
anything, the court in Bowring established an even more restrictive standard
for invoking the right to treatment. Aside from the typical medical care
requirements that a serious disease or injury be involved and that the
requested treatment be a matter of medical necessity and not merely desir-
able, the court restricted the right to treatment by excluding those prisoners
whose illnesses are incurable or incapable of being substantially alleviated5 °
and by not requiring any treatment that might be considered too costly or too
time-consuming.5"
It is indeed reasonable that prison officials should not be charged with
948 (1975) (court ordered hiring of additional medical personnel); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (court ordered hiring of additional medical personnel, compliance with
American Correctional Association standards relating to medical services for prisoners and
compliance with state licensing requirements for hospital and infirmary); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (court ordered prompt action to
protect lives, safety and health of prisoners without dealing specifically with improvements in
health care).
45. E.g., Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1226 (2d Cir. 1974).
46. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1332 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 948 (1975). The court found that the medical care available in the Alabama prison system
was barbarous and shocking to the conscience. Id. at 1330 & n. 14. One factor that contributed
to this conclusion was the lack of care provided for mentally disturbed inmates. Despite the
seriousness of the situation, the state provided the services of only a single part-time clinical
psychologist. The court found such inadequate care to be unconstitutional. Id. at 1333. The
court, however, went no further than to order the prison officials to hire additional medical
personnel.
47. See Comment, supra note 8.
48. See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
49. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
50. Id. at 47.
51. Id. at 48. Apparently, these determinations are to be left to the discretion of prison
officials.
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the obligation of treating the untreatable. 52 It is, however, certainly not
unreasonable to require them to provide such other rudimentary care as may
be needed.53 The Supreme Court has recognized that the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is intended to
protect prisoners from the unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering. 54 If
such pain and suffering is the result of an untreated medical ailment and can
be alleviated in whole or part, it should be irrelevant whether that ailment is
ultimately incurable. Moreover, when mental illness is involved, the incur-
able illness exception to the right to treatment makes it far too easy to
discriminate unfairly against unfavored inmates by labeling them "untreat-
able." 55 Without some check on this power to arbitrarily refuse to treat, the
prisoner's right to mental health care may be converted into a privilege that
must be earned by compliance with the regulations of the prison system.
The court's decision limiting the right to treatment on a cost and time
basis is inconsistent with better reasoned prior case law. It has become an
axiom of constitutional law that constitutional rights cannot be withheld due
to a lack of economic resources. 56 For example, in Holt v. Sarver,57 the
district court rejected the argument that wholesale improvements in prison
conditions were impossible until the legislatures appropriate more funds.
Instead, it held that the minimum constitutional requirements must be
unconditionally satisfied. 58 It follows, then, that the right to treatment
should not be conditioned on the length of time required or the cost
involved. As the court in Bowring noted, "[T]he essential test is one of
medical necessity." ' 59 If the illness in question qualifies as a medical
necessity, the appropriate treatment should be provided regardless of
whether that treatment consists of first-aid or long term chemotherapy. This
restriction on the right to treatment is especially critical in the area of mental
health care where a substantial amount of time is usually required for any
treatment to be effective.
Perhaps the most restrictive aspect of the court's holding is the express
refusal to entertain any complaints regarding the adequacy of a particular
52. With the continuing advances being made in medical science, it may be irresponsible
to label any mental illness "incurable" or "untreatable."
53. Hutchens v. Alabama, 466 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1972) (terminally ill inmate alleged a lack
of medical attention and medication needed to relieve temporarily his pain and suffering).
54. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104.
55. See Stokes v. Institutional Bd. of Patuxent, 357 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D. Md. 1973)
(plaintiff returned to the regular prison system after being diagnosed as untreatable).
56. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963); Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
57. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
58. Id. at 379.
59. 551 F.2d at 48. A medical necessity is just that, a necessity. The type of treatment
required should not determine whether that necessity will go untreated.
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course of treatment.' According to the court, the Constitution requires that
only the barest minimums be satisfied. 61 The actual quality of the treatment
prescribed is not subject to attack. Only such intentional deprivations as
would be shocking to the conscience are unconstitutional. 62 Under this
standard, a prisoner is entitled to some, but not the best or even an effective,
treatment. 63 For all practical purposes, even the most rudimentary medical
care facilities will meet the constitutional minimums. 64 Once again, the net
effect of this limitation on the right to treatment may be to allow prison
officials to abuse their discretion by treating truly adequate mental health
care as a privilege rather than a right.
Admittedly, there are good reasons for limiting access to the federal
courts in regard to alleged denials of prisoners' rights to psychological
and/or psychiatric treatment. Courts are naturally unwilling to presume that
prison officials intentionally mistreat the inmates in their charge. Without
some prior indication of bad faith, they are understandably reluctant to
undertake the difficult task of examining prisoners' complaints regarding
conditions of confinement. 65 Moreover, the federal courts generally do not
wish to intervene in the affairs of a state prison when the only issue involves
a difference of opinion between a prisoner and a presumably qualified
medical officer. 66 This reluctance has probably been accentuated by the
many frivolous complaints with which the courts have been deluged. 67
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the major effect of these limitations
is to entrust the prisoners' constitutional right to all types of medical care to
the nearly unreviewable discretion of a few prison officials. 68 Though courts
60. Id.
61. Id.; see, e.g., McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 1975) (confinement in a
primitive isolation cell was insufficient treatment for mentally-disturbed inmate); Newman v.
Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1333 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (more than one
part-time psychologist is required for a prison population as large as that of Alabama).
62. 551 F.2d at 48; see, e.g., Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 419 U.S. 813, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974);Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626
(9th Cir. 1970). The treatment must be within the realm of legitimate medical judgment.
63. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (hospital need not
show that the treatment will cure or even improve involuntarily committed mental patient's
condition, but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so); Stokes v. Institutional Bd. of
Patuxent, 357 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D. Md. 1973).
64. See Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
65. See, e.g., Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1973); Cates v. Ciccone, 422
F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1970).
66. Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (citing Shields v.
Kunkel, 442 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971)).
67. See, e.g., Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970); United Slates exrel. Hyde v.
McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970).
68. At least one commentator has suggested that this problem of excessive discretion
could be eliminated by court-appointed medical review boards composed of qualified phygi-
cians or by permitting inmates to be examined by privately retained physicians. This last
suggestion, however, may be subject to criticism as a denial of equal protection insofar as some
inmates would not be able to afford private care. See SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED (1972).
1978] 619
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may not wish to assume that that discretion is being abused, the incon-
trovertible fact is that the quality of health care provided in the correctional
institutions of this country is "shockingly substandard. "69
The only effective means of dealing with the various mental and
emotional problems that are so widespread among prisoners is to develop a
systematic mental health care program within the prison system. Certainly
such a program would be consistent with the goal of rehabilitation that
served as one of the premises for the Bowring court's recognition of the
right to treatment.70 Given that rehabilitation is one of the avowed purposes
of incarceration7 and that prisoners are constitutionally entitled to essential
medical care, 72 it would seem both logical and practical that they should be
entitled to the type of long term psychological and/or psychiatric treatment
that may be necessary to help them cope with the pressures of society when
they are released from prison.73 Indeed, it is difficult to identify the point at
which psychological treatment ceases to be concerned with the limited goal
of curing a particular mental or emotional disturbance and begins to be
concerned with general rehabilitation. 74 Unfortunately, the federal courts
have consistently adhered to the view that the failure of prison officials to
provide inmates with rehabilitative programs does not, in itself, constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.
75
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Trop v. Dulles76 that the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment must be
interpreted in light of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society," 77 it is doubtful that the constitutional
standards for mental health care will ever evolve beyond the minimum
69. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONER'S RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 180
(1976). For example, while the warden of North Carolina's Central Prison, Sam P. Garrison,
believes that the prison hospital "is one of the finest in a prison in the United States," the
prison system's chief of health and food services, Richard A. Keil, acknowledges that the
facilities do not come close to meeting the state's own hospital licensing standards. Nichols,
Health Care Behind Bars: A Diagnosis, Raleigh, N.C., News & Observer, Mar. 20, 1977, § IV,
at , col. I.
Efforts are, however, being made to rectify this situation. In November 1977, the Division
of Mental Health Services of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources entered into
a preliminary agreement with the Department of Corrections to assist in formulating an
effective plan for the delivery of mental health care to the inmate population. Memorandum of
Understanding Between North Carolina Department of Corrections and North Carolina Depart-
ment of Human Resources (Nov. 29, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law
Review).
70. 551 F.2d at 48.
71. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 248 (1949); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 420 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
72. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
73. See Comment, supra note 8.
74. Id. at 720.
75. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F. Supp. 526, 528 (W.D. Va. 1974).
76. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
77. Id. at 101.
620 [Vol. 56
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guidelines enunciated in Bowring v. Godwin.78 As for now, the best hope of
implementing a meaningful right to psychological and/or psychiatric diag-
nosis and treatment appears to be suits under state administrative procedure
acts to compel compliance with the state correctional statutes that recognize,
in varying degrees, the general rehabilitative aim of incarceration. 79 Until\
such time as some effective means is found to implement such a right to
treatment, the general mental health problems of state prisoners are likely to
be ignored.80
STEVEN L. HOARD
78. But see James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (because of this
evolving standard of decency from which the eighth amendment draws its meaning, a federal
court may rule on whether lack of rehabilitative programs constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment even though other courts have previously ruled that it did not); Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. at 379 ("This Court knows that a sociological theory or idea may ripen into constitu-
tional law.").
79. See Comment, A Statutory Right to Treatment for Prisoners: Society's Right of Self-
Defense, 50 NEB. L. REv. 543 (1971). Though most states have enacted legislation defining the
general standard of medical care to be provided in the state's prisons, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §
148-36 (Cum. Supp. 1977), the coverage is frequently incomplete and the wording vague-
80. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 742, 753-54 (1969)
("We may soon realize that the necessities of life are a matter of personal right and societal
duty, and not a bounty at all. Mental health is the most basic of these necessities. We owe it to
every man.").
1978]
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